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Recent Ruling
SECURITIES REGULATION - MARGIN REQUIREMENTS -
INSTALLMENT PURCHASE OF TAX-SHELTERED PROGRAMS
37 Fed. Reg. 6568 (1972).
Credit regulation in the securities market was generated primar-
ily by the excessive credit extensions of the 1920's.1 In the hope of
protecting potential investors,' and, at the same time, creating a
mechanism that would have a stabilizing effect on the stock market
and thus the economy as a whole,3 Congress granted to the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) the power to
regulate the extension of credit by brokers and dealers "[f]or the
purpose of preventing excessive use of credit for the purchase or
carrying of Securities .... -4 In accordance with that statutory grant
of power, the Board promulgated Regulation T to regulate exten-
sions of credit by all brokers and dealers in securities.5 That regu-
lation both fixes the margin requirements on all securities for which
1 SeeS. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4,8 (1934).
2 Credit restrictions prevent the investor from buying securities on such thin col-
lateral that market fluctuations force him into financial ruin. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). See also note 3 infra.
32 L. Loss, SEcurirEs REGULATION 1242-43 (2d ed. 1961); S. Doc. No. 123,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 409-10 (1952). The potential effect of unrestricted credit on both
the investor and the market is readily apparent. In simplified form, when the lender
has extended as much credit as the investor's collateral will support, any slight drop
in price would cause him to call for additional collateral. If the investor has nothing
more to pledge for his loan, he will be forced to sell a portion of his stock in order to
reduce his debt to a level acceptable to his creditor. This sale will further depress
the price of the stock, leading to further calls for additional collateral and the entire
process could result in an unending downward spiral. By placing restrictions on the
extension of credit, Congress hoped that collateral calls would not become necessary
unless there was a drastic drop in prices on the stock market. Solomon & Hart, Recent
Developments in the Regulation of Securities Credit, 20 J. PUB. L. 167, 169 (1971).
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Exchange Act]. In addition to protecting investors and stabilizing the market,
credit restrictions also serve to allocate the nation's credit resources. By restricting cred-
it in the stock market, credit resources may be channeled toward potentially more de-
sirable commercial, industrial, and agricultural uses. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). Credit restrictions can also serve to implement general mon-
etary policy aimed at controlling inflationary pressures. 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1245.
But see Moore, Stock Market Margin Requirements, 74 J. POL. EcoN. 158 (1966).
5 Regulation T, Credit by Brokers, Dealers, and Members of National Securities Ex-
changes, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1972). The Regulation is applicable even though the broker
or dealer may not be registered under § 15 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o
(1970), due to the exclusively intrastate nature of his business. 12 C.F.R. § 220.1
(1972).
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credit may be extended, and determines which securities are eligible
for credit sales.
In a recent ruling, the Board concluded that the sale by brokers
or dealers of tax-shelter programs which contain provisions for pay-
ment in installments constituted "arranging for credit" in violation
of Regulation T.6  The Board determined that the programs were
securities within the meaning of Regulation T and that, since the
securities were neither margin securities nor exempt from regula-
tion, their sale on credit terms violated Regulation T.7  However,
the Board limited the application of its ruling in a manner that has
generated considerable confusion as to the scope of Regulation T.
While a detailed analysis of the statutory and regulatory frame-
work of margin regulation is not within the scope of this discussion,
an outline of the basic provisions is necessary to an examination
of the ruling. As previously indicated, the statutory authority for
the Board's power is in section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act) .8 Section 7(a) of that Act originally estab-
lished a flexible formula for determining margin requirements,' but
the Board soon replaced this procedure with a specific loan value
for all securities subject to margin requirements." Section 7(b)
grants to the Board the power to raise or lower margin require-
6 37 Fed. Reg. 6568 (1972), 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 22,282 (1972).
7id.
8 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970). It should be noted that there is an additional statutory
restriction on extensions of credit by broker-dealers in § 11(d) (1) of the Exchange
Act. In an attempt to further protect potential investors, Congress included a 30-day
prohibition, enforceable by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on credit ex-
tensions by individuals who are both brokers and dealers and who are participants in
the distribution of a new issue of non-exempt securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(1) (1970);
2. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 84-88 (1965);
see text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
9 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970). This formula was inserted in § 7 as a temporary
measure primarily to protect the Board from undue speculative pressure while it was
formulating more extensive and effective methods of regulating credit. H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1934). Additional reasons for the inclusion of a spe-
cific formula can be found in 2 LOSS, supra note 3, at 1243.
10 The "margin" or "margin requirement" is the minimum amount a customer
must deposit in his account in addition to the securities he has purchased. The cus-
tomer may deposit additional funds or he may utilize the unused loan value of other
securities in the account. WEISS, supra note 8, at 73 n.9; Solomon & Hart, supra note
3, at 170 n.17. For example, if the Board establishes a 45 percent maximum loan
value, the margin requirement is 55 percent of the current market value. Thus, a cus-
tomer purchasing a security for 100 dollars must pay 55 dollars.in cash or securities
whose value is 55 dollars determined at 45 percent of their market value. 2 LOss,
supra note 3, at 1244. Thus, by varying the maximum loan value and therefore the
margin requirement, the Board is able to contract or expand the amount of credit which
may be extended for the purchase or carrying of securities. See note 4 supra & accom-
panying text.
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ments as the needs of commerce and industry and the general credit
situation in the country may require.'" And, section 7 (c) makes
it unlawful for a broker or dealer to extend, maintain, or arrange
credit for a customer (1) on any non-exempt security in contraven-
tion of the Board's rules, or (2) without collateral or on any col-
lateral other than securities.'2 Section 7 does not apply to securities
specifically exempted from the Exchange Act or securities which
have been exempted from the credit provisions of the Act by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).'3
Regulation T, developed by the Board pursuant to section 7 of
the Exchange Act, establishes the rules by which brokers and dealers
may extend credit to their customers.' 4 The Regulation performs
essentially two functions: first, it defines the maximum loan value,
and therefore the margin requirements, of securities on which credit
may be extended by brokers and dealers; second, it specifies the se-
curities on which a broker or dealer may not extend credit under
any conditions.' 5
Section 3(c) of Regulation T requires brokers and dealers to
carry all credit transactions in a "general account" which is subject
to the margin requirements established by the Board.'6 If the cus-
tomer does not deposit the required margin within four business
days after the transaction, the creditor (broker or dealer) has only
two alternatives. He may apply for an extension of time to allow
his customer to meet the margin requirements 7 or he must cancel
1115 U.S.C. § 78g(b) (1970).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
'3 Section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970), in addition
to exempting specific securities, allows the SEC, by rules and regulations in the public
interest or for the protection of investors, to exempt additional securities from those
provisions of the Act, such as § 7, which do not apply to exempted securities. See, e.g.,
text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
'4 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1972). For a detailed analysis of Regulation T, see Solomon &
Hart, supra note 3; Comment, Credit Regulation in the Securities Market: An Analysis
of Regulation T, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (1967).
I5 WEISS, supra note 8, at 73. Although section 7(a) of the Exchange Act directs
the Board to require the maintenance of certain margins, the only maintenance require-
ment in Regulation T is a prohibition against withdrawals whose effect would be to un-
dermargin the account. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b)(2) (1972); 2 Loss, supra note 3, at
1250-51.
16 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c) (1972). Regulation T also includes provisions for numer-
ous "special" accounts which are not relevant to this discussion as they contain modi-
fied margin requirements or do not involve extensions of credit at all. See, e.g., 12
C.F.R. §§ 220.4(b), (d), (f) (1972).
1712 C.F.R. § 220.3(f) (1972).
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as much of the transaction as is necessary to bring the account with-
in the margin requirements. 8
Section 7(a) of the Regulation prevents a broker or dealer from
doing indirectly what he cannot do directly: he cannot arrange for
someone else to extend credit to an investor on terms other than
those which the broker or dealer could have extended himself. 9
Finally, section 8, the Supplement to Regulation T, does not per-
mit brokers or dealers, for the purpose of purchasing or carrying
securities, to assign any loan value to any security that is not (1)
registered on a national securities exchange, (2) included on the
Board's Over-the-Counter (OTC) Margin List,' or (3) exempted
by statute from the regulation.2'
The power to enforce the rules established by the Board rests
primarily with the SEC.22 The Exchange Act provides for both
administrative and criminal sanctions against brokers or dealers for
violations of the Board's rules and regulations.' In addition, sec-
tion 7(f) of the Exchange Act now extends such sanctions to the
18 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c) (1972).
19 A creditor [broker or dealer] may arrange for the extension or maintenance
of credit to or for any customer of such creditor by any person upon the same
terms and conditions as those upon which the creditor, under the provisions
of this part, may himself extend or maintain such credit to such customer, but
only upon such terms or conditions....
12 C.F.R. § 220.7(a) (1972).
20The Regulation originally did not include securities traded over the counter. In
1968 § 7 of the Exchange Act was amended by deleting "registered on a national
securities exchange" and "who transacts a business in securities through the medium
of any such member" wherever they occurred. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970), amending 15
U.S.C. § 78g (1964).
21 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1972). See note 13 supra.
22 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1262.
23 The primary administrative sanctions are found in § 15(b)(5) of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (5) (1970), and include censure, denial of registration, revo-
cation, and suspension of a broker's registration for up to 12 months. In addition, the
broker may be suspended or excluded from the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). Exchange Act §§ 15a(l) (1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(/) (1), (2)
(1970). Under § 21(e) the SEC can seek to enjoin violations of Regulation T.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). The authority to seek criminal prosecution, Exchange Act
§ 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970), rarely has been used against brokers and dealers.
2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1263.
In addition to the sanctions imposed by the Exchange Act, the courts have implied
a civil remedy for violations of Regulation T. In many instances the customer has been
permitted to recover any financial loss suffered as a result of the broker or dealer's ac-
tion in allowing the illegal extension of credit. See, e.g., Avery v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 328 F. Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1971); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 409 F.2d 1360 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D.
Mass. 1949).
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investor as well. 4 Thus it is important that the scope of Regula-
tion T be dearly defined so that investors, as well as brokers and
dealers, are aware of their responsibilities.
The sharp increase in tax-sheltered programs and the varied
methods which promoters have developed to finance them have cre-
ated increasing concern about their regulation.25 These programs,
which include, inter alia, "oil and gas exploration programs, real
estate syndications (except real estate investment trusts), citrus
grove developments and cattle programs,"2 6 are generally organized
as unincorporated associations, offering investors substantial flow-
through tax benefits. In addition, these programs often contain
provisions that allow payment to be made in installments. When
the potential investor contracts to buy an interest in the program,
which is usually organized as a limited partnership, he need only
make a down-payment. The balance of the purchase price is then
paid in installments, often continuing over a period of years. The
investor, however, becomes entitled to the benefits and subject to the
risks of his investment at the time he enters into the contract.28
In effect, therefore, credit is being extended to the purchaser until
he has fulfilled his contractual obligation.
In its ruling, the Board stated that tax-shelter programs of this
type are "securities" within the meaning of both the Securities Act
24 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(1) (1970). The effect in the area of implied civil remedies
of this extension of liability to the investor is not yet clear. The investor's civil remedy
was based, at least in part, on the fact that while brokers and dealers were prohibited
from extending credit in violation of Regulation T, customers were not fobidden to ac-
cept it. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1141 (2d Cir. 1970). Under
Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1972), promulgated pursuant to § 7(f), both the broker
and the investor are in violation of the Regulation and those judges who have dissented
from the gradual but steady expansion of implied civil remedies may yet win the battle.
See id. at 1145-49 (Friendly, J., dissenting). For the proposition that Regulation X
does not mandate overruling prior decisions see Note, Regulation X and Investor-Lender
Margin Violation Disputes, 57 MINN. L REV. 208 (1972).
25 The Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, as passed by the Senate, con-
tained sections which would have brought certain tax-sheltered oil and gas programs
within its regulatory provisions. Those sections were deleted before the Act was passed
with the understanding that the oil and gas industries would develop appropriate leg-
islation in conjunction with the SEC. H.R. REP. No. 1631, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1970). See also note 49 infra & accompanying text.
2637 Fed. Reg. 6568 (1972), 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 22,282(a) (1972).
27 Thus the investor is able to obtain directly the tax advantages provided in the
Internal Revenue Code for the association. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
701-708.
28This general description of tax-shelter programs is based on the Board's general
characterization of tax-shelter programs within the ruling itself. 37 Fed. Reg. 6568
(1972), 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 22,282(b) (1972).
19731
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24: 391
of 1933 (Securities Act) 29 and the Exchange Act.30 The broad
manner in which the term "security" is defined in both Acts coupled
with the equally broad interpretation of this term by the courts
seem to support the Board's conclusion.3' Tax-shelter programs are,
therefore, securities for the purpose of Regulation T12 and must
comply with the credit requirements of that regulation. Since tax-
shelter-programs are not registered on a national securities exchange,
included on the Board's OTC Margin List, or exempted by statute
from the provisions of Regulation T, section 8 of the Regulation
prohibits brokers or dealers from assigning any loan value to these
programs."3 Thus, the Board concluded that the sale of tax-shelter
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
30 The numerous variations conceived to finance tax-shelter programs have been un-
able to avoid the broad scope given to the term "security" by the statutes and the courts.
"It embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaption to
meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money
of others on the promise of profits." SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
Generally courts will look beyond the form of financing to the substance of the plan.
E.g., SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939). For a detailed dis-
cussion of unsuccessful attempts to avoid the definition of "security" in the oil and gas
industries, see Jordon, Regulation of the Sale of Oil and Gas Interests - Ohio and
Federal, 26 Onio ST. L.J. 567, 578 (1965).
31 The definition of "security" in the Exchange Act includes, inter alia, "certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other
mineral royalty or lease," and "any instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ex-
change Act § 3(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970). See Securities Act § 2(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1) (1970). For a thorough discussion of the concept of a "security," see Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W.
REs. L. REv. 367 (1967). Professor Coffey's "economic realities" approach to-the
security concept has apparently been adopted by the SEC. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5211, Exchange Act Release No. 9387, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC L. REP. 5 78,446 (Nov. 30, 1971).
3 2 Regulation T adopts the definition of security as stated in the Exchange Act. 12
C.F.R. § 220.2 (a) (1972). Whether all tax-shelter programs are securities for the
purposes of Regulation T is not entirely free from doubt. The Board has previously
indicated that there is no violation of Regulation T when a broker-dealer participates
in the installment sale of certain real estate investment contracts secured by mortgages
with separate service contracts available at the option of the investor. [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 78,072 (FRB April 26, 1971). However,
the factual pattern on which this opinion was based is virtually identical to that in SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). The Court in Howey held that such real
estate programs constituted securities and found the test to be "whether the scheme in-
volves an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from
the efforts of others." Id. at 301. The Court emphasized that it is immaterial "whether
there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value." Id. See also Coffey, supra
note 31, at 373-76, 386-90. In light of Howey, therefore, it would seem that if the
Board's letter was based on a determination that real estate investment contracts are not
securities, then it was incorrect. Alternatively, if the Board concluded that real estate in-
vestments contracts were securities, but were not subject to Regulation T, then the recent
ruling would seem to overrule that determination, at least to the extent that real estate
investment contracts are required to be registered under § 5 of the Securities Act.
83 See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
REGULATION T
programs on an installment basis by brokers and dealers constituted
"arranging for credit" on terms more favorable to the investor
than the broker or dealer himself could have offered, and that, there-
fore, such sales violated section 7 of Regulation T. 4
Perhaps the most intriguing question raised by the Board's rul-
ing relates to the scope of Regulation T. The ruling is addressed
specifically3 5 to tax-shelter programs registered pursuant to section 5
of the Securities ActY6 Regulation T, however, was developed pur-
suant to the authority granted to the Board by section 7 of the
Exchange Act, and its application would appear to be limited only
by the provisions of that Act. The Board admits that tax-shelter
programs are "securities" within the definition of that term in the
Exchange Act.ar Section 7 of the Exchange Act grants to the Board
the power to regulate "the amount of credit that may be initially
extended and subsequently maintained on any security (other than
an exempted security).""' Regulation T forbids brokers or dealers
from assigning loan values to any security not meeting the stan-
dards of section 8 of that Regulation." There is no indication in
section 7 of the Exchange Act, in the definition of "security" in the
Exchange Act,40 in any other section of that Act, or in Regulation
T itself,41 of any intent to limit the scope of margin regulation to
securities registered under section 5 of the Securities Act. The lan-
guage of the Exchange Act and of Regulation T dearly indicates a
contrary intent. Yet the Board's ruling, if it is read to exclude by
inference any securities not registered under the Securities Act,
makes it entirely possible for tax-shelter programs that are "securi-
3437 Fed. Reg. 6568 (1972), 2 CCH FED. SEc L. REP. 5 22,282(f) (1972). The
Board is, therefore, concluding that when a broker or dealer participates in the sale of a
program which is designed to be bought in installments, he is arranging for the exten-
sion of credit to investors even though he is doing nothing more than passing the pro-
gram through from the promoter to the investor.
35Id., 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5 22,282(a) (1972). The Board's ruling was ap-
parently the result of a letter from the NASD seeking a clarification of the "arranging
for credit" provisions of Regulation T with specific reference to the distribution of
tax-shelter oil and gas programs. The NASD letter presumes that the programs have
been registered pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act. Letter from National As-
sociation of Security Dealers, Inc. to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
August 16, 1971, on file at Case Western Reserve Law Review.
86 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
37 37 Fed. Reg. 6568 (1972), CCH FED. SEC. L REP. 9 22,282(e) (1972). See
Jordan, supra note 30.
38 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
39 12 C.F.R. § 220.8 (1972).
40 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (1970).
41 See 12 C.F.R. § 220.2 (1972).
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ties" within the meaning of the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act to escape the credit restrictions of Regulation T if they qualify
for exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act.42  The Board's ruling, therefore, could be interpreted as ex-
cluding from margin regulation tax-shelter programs which are ex-
empt from registration such as private offerings,4 intrastate offer-
ings,44 or limited public issue offerings specifically exempted by the
SEC.45
While it is possible that the Board was simply limiting its rul-
ing to the factual situation which had been presented for determi-
nation,40 subsequent statements by the Board and the National As-
sociation of Securities Dealers (NASD) indicate confusion as to the
scope of the ruling. It is not surprising that the NASD strongly
disagrees with the Board's position and has already indicated its in-
tent to support legislation, drafted principally by the oil and gas
industries, which would include provisions permitting the install-
ment sale of oil and gas programs through brokers and dealers.
Periodic payment plans are, in the opinion of the NASD, simply
methods of insuring that income will be available to the enterprise
as it becomes needed, rather than methods of extending credit in
excess of the credit regulations.48 Oil and gas programs do not
42 For a discussion of these exemptions, see Jordan, supra note 30, at 580-89.
43 Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
44 Id. § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970).
45 The SEC may exempt any class of securities if it finds enforcement of the Act is
not necessary in the public interest or for the protection of investors due to the small
amount involved or the limited character of the public offering. Securities Act § 3(b),
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970). For example, Regulation A permits a limited registration
for certain types of securities where the aggregate offering price of the issue does not ex-
ceed 500,000 dollars. SEC Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1972). Similarly,
Regulation B permits a limited registration for offerors of fractional undivided interests
in oil and gas rights if the aggregate amount of the offering does not exceed 250,000
dollars. SEC Reg. B, 37 Fed. Reg. 23829 (1972), 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 5 2399
(1972).
46 While this interpretation is buttressed by the NASD letter to the Board, see note
35 supra, its validity is questionable in light of the Board's subsequent clarifying letter
to the NASD. See note 51 infra.
4 T NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC, TAX SHELTERED PROGRAMS 8 (1972).
See text accompanying notes 55-58 infra.
48 Id. The NASD prefers the term "periodic payments" as opposed to "installment
payments," apparently because the latter term is too closely associated with the exten-
sion of credit. The NASD does not explain, however, how changing the name of these
payments makes them any less credit extensions. If the customer is going to accept the
benefits and be subject to the risks of his interest at the time he makes a down-payment,
then, to the extent that he has not paid the full purchase price, he is being extended
credit. The fact that the program may not need the full purchase price at the time of
the investment seems irrelevant to a determination of whether, in fact, credit has been
extended.
REGULATION T
need, and, the NASD claims do not want, all of the money inves-
tors commit themselves to pay until it is actually needed in the
program.49 In terms of general policy, the NASD has maintained
that periodic payment plans, at least in the oil and gas field, are en-
tirely consistent with the public interest, and if not exempted entire-
ly from credit regulation, should be regulated in a more liberal man-
ner than Regulation T would permit.5"
In view of the NASD's policy position, it is only logical that
they would attempt to interpret the scope of the Board's ruling as
narrowly as possible. Thus, it is surprising that the NASD inter-
prets the ruling as a bar to the distribution by brokers and dealers
of "interstate programs of any kind which provide for periodic pay-
ments ..... 51 If valid, the NASD interpretation might imply that
the Board's decision was limited to securities registered under sec-
tion 5 of the Securities Act based on what it considered to be juris-
dictional limitations. The implication that some type of interstate
program is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the Board for the pur-
49 Id. If the programs were offered in the form of conditional sales contracts, the
investor would have no rights or obligations under the interest purchased until he had
paid the full purchase price. Thus, there is no credit extension and Regulation T
would not apply. Another approach would be to structure the installment payments
so that they are not mandatory. The investor's interest in this program would increase
only in proportion to his actual investments. If there is no binding obligation on the
investor to make subsequent payments, and certain other conditions are met, the broker-
dealer is no longer arranging for the extension of credit. [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC L REP. 9 78,075 (FRB April 26, 1971). However, the NASD rejects
this approach as unworkable since "before a program can commence ... operations, it
must know with a reasonable degree of certainty the amount of money it has at its dis-
posal." Letter from National Association of Security Dealers, Inc., supra note 35, at 4.50 TAx SHELTER PROGRAMS, supra note 47, at 8. The unanswerable question,
however, is why programs which are not registered on securities exchanges should re-
ceive more favorable credit treatment that those which are registered. Exactly the op-
posite would seem more realistic and consistent with the underlying rationales of secu-
rities regulation and monetary control. See notes 2-4 supra. But see letter from National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., supra note 35, at 5-9.
51 Id. (emphasis added). The NASD interpretation appears to be a wholesale accep-
tance of statements made by the Division of Supervision and Regulation of the Federal
Reserve Board in a letter to the NASD, which states in part: 'The interpretation ...
does not cover securities exempted from [registration under the Securities Act) under
§ 77c(a) (11) or transactions exempted from such registration under § 77d(a) [sic] of
that Act, the so-called 'intra-state' and 'private offering' exemptions." Letter -from
Laura M. Homer, Attorney for Division of Supervision and Regulation to George
Warner, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., April 4, 1972, on file at Case
Western Reserve Law Review. Apparently the NASD assumed that the Board's enumer-
ation of securities not covered by the ruling was all-indusive. Consequently the NASD
concluded that securities falling within the § 3(b) exemption of the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970), i.e., Regulation A and Regulation B securities, must be included
within the Board's ruling. This conclusion, of course, is in direct conflict with the
plain language-of the ruling itself which speaks only to securities registered under § 5
of the Securities Act.
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pose of triggering the credit restrictions of Regulation T is not sup-
ported by federal jurisdictional concepts. If the Board sees its juris-
diction as coextensive with the jurisdictional coverage of the
registration provisions of the Securities Act, then all that is required
is the "use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails ... ."52 Thus,
even if the Board's jurisdiction is identical with that of the Securities
Act, or, for example, the jurisdiction of the SEC over brokers and
dealers under section 5 of the Exchange Act,a it has the authority
to regulate all tax-shelter programs, whether they are exempted from
registration under the Securities Act or not, provided use is made
of the mails or any instrument of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce. While there is no direct statutory authority
on the Board's section 7 jurisdiction, the 1968 amendments to that
section so substantially broadened the scope of the Board's regula-
tory power that it is difficult to believe the Board limited its ruling
on this ground."4
That the Board has authority to regulate all tax-shelter programs
appears to be supported by proposed legislation recently submitted
to Congress 'by the SEC in conjunction with the oil and gas indus-
try.55 This legislation would apply liberal credit requirements to oil
and gas programs which are neither registered under the Securities
Act nor exempt from registration under Regulation B.5 6 Section
16(b) of this proposed legislation specifically exempts tax-shelter
oil and gas programs that are in compliance with the credit require-
52 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (1970). Interstate commerce is defined so broadly in the
Securities Act that recent court decisions have even indicated that there is no need to
actually cross state lines. Even intrastate telephone calls in connection with the sale
may bring the transaction within federal jurisdiction on the theory that the telephone
system is itself an instrument of interstate commerce. Levin v. Marder, 343-F. Supp.
1050 (1972); Lennerth v. Mendenhall, 234 F. Supp. 59 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Contra,
Burke v. Triple A Machine Shop, 438 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1971). Indeed, the SEC has
indicated, at least within the context of rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972),
that intrastate sales by telephone are subject to the rules of the Exchange Act. See
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 7693, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 5 77,279 at 82,443 n. 4 (Aug. 31, 1965); 4 LOSs, supra note 3, at 2316.
53 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970).
54 The confusion over "jurisdictional means" may stem from the fact that, when
Congress removed the phrases "registered on a national securities exchange" and "who
transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member," § 7 no
longer contained any specific jurisdictional supports to guide the Board. See note 20
supra.
55 S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This bill can be found in substantially the
same form in Regulation of Oil and Gas Programs, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. (Special
Report No. 428, 1972).
56 S. 1050, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(c)(6) (1973).
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ments of proposed section 16(a) from the margin requirements of
Regulation T.57  The SEC inclusion of section 16(b) strongly im-
plies that oil and gas programs which would be registered under this
proposed legislation are presently subject to the credit restrictions
of Regulation T notwithstanding the limited scope of the Board's
ruling. For example, programs which qualify for the section 3(a)
(11) intrastate exemption under the Securities Act are not covered
by the Board's ruling.58 Yet these same programs are considered
oil programs for the purposes of the SEC legislation and are, there-
fore, exempted from the "arranging for credit" provisions of Regu-
lation T assuming they comply with section 16(a).
The apparent disagreement between the SEC and the Board on
the scope of Regulation T is further confused by earlier indications
from the SEC clearly implying that there are securities with respect
to which brokers and dealers may extend or arrange credit without
being subject to margin regulation. Rule 15c2-5, adopted by the
SEC in 1962, imposes broad disclosure and suitability determination
requirements on any broker or dealer (whether or not registered
under Exchange Act section 15) who offers to extend or arrange
credit under circumstances not covered by Regulation T.59 This
rule was prompted by the development of "equity funding" pro-
grams in the insurance industry.60 In 1969, however, credit exten-
sions by brokers and dealers in connection with the sale of these
"equity funding" programs became subject to Regulation T.61  In
1972, as a result of this inclusion, the SEC amended rule 15c2-5 in
57id. § 16(b):
The sale of a program participation issued by an oil program, the purchase
price of which is payable in installments in compliance with subsection (a)
shall not be deemed to be an extension of credit by any person for the pur-
poses of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, nor shall the distribution of such
a security involve an arrangement for the extension of credit for such pur-
pose.
5 8 See text accompanying note 44 supra.
9 17 C.F.R. § 2 4 0.15c2-5 (1972), as amended 37 Fed. Reg. 22612 (1972). Viola-
tion of this rule constitutes a "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice"
under 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2) (1970).
60 These programs have also been refered to as "secured funding" or "life funding"
programs. The SEC now refers to all of these programs as "insurance premium fund-
ing" programs. 37 Fed. Reg. 16409 (1972). In a typical program, securities, particu-
larly mutual funds, are sold to customers who then apply those securities as collateral on
a loan. The customer then applies the loan he received to the premium on a life insur-
ance policy which he purchased at about the same time. As the cash value of the life
insurance increases, further loans are then made on the life insurance policy thus pro-
viding additional funds for investment. Finally, additional loans may also be made on
the appreciated value of the securities. 27 Fed. Reg. 5190 (1962).
61 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(k) (1972).
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order to insure its continued application to "equity funding" pro-
grams now regulated under Regulation T.6" The SEC's comments
accompanying the proposed amendment to rule 15c2-5 indicate that,
while the rule was adopted primarily to regulate "equity funding"
programs, "it was broadly worded to encompass other types of ar-
rangements which would involve the borrowing of funds by cus-
tomers in a manner other than by conventional margin security
transactions governed by Regulation T."65 Implicitly, the SEC seems
to be indicating that there may be broker-dealer transactions in se-
curities to which the margin requirements of Regulation T are not
applicable."
The vagueness and confusion within the SEC concerning the
scope of Regulation T may to some extent stem from an over-cau-
tious attitude developed as a result of the Board's ruling. For ex-
ample, the report of the SEC Real Estate Advisory Committee
(REAC) late in 1972 proposed that installment payments for the
purchase of real estate securities be permitted where the minimum
62 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-5 (1972), as amended 37 Fed. Reg. 22612 (1972).
63 37 Fed. Reg. 16409 (1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 5 78,932 (Aug. 10, 1972). The SEC, however, did not specify any security or
class of securities, other than equity funding programs, which would not be subject to
Regulation T.
64 In addition, a close reading of rule 15c2-5 makes one wonder why any program
would want to avoid the margin requirements of Regulation T if the alternative is
meeting the detailed suitability determination requirements of 15c2-5. In margin
transactions, brokers and dealers must fully disclose all credit terms. SEC rule 10b-16,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1972). Registered brokers or dealers who are not members of
a registered association (i.e. NASD) must meet two additional requirements: (1) they
must have "reasonable grounds" for their belief that the recommended purchase, sale,
or exchange is "not unsuitable" for the customer, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1972), and
(2) they must have kept a customer record indicating all the factors considered in making
the recommendation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-6 (a) (1) (B) (1972). Those securities
not subject to Regulation T, however, must also meet the requirements of rule 15c2-5.
In addition to disclosing credit terms, the broker-dealer must make a complete suita-
bility study. He must then inform the investor of the risks and advantages of the entire
transaction as well as the basis for his determination that the entire transaction is suit-
able for that individual. The requirement of affirmatively establishing suitability places
a greater burden on the broker or dealer than the requirement of simply negating un-
suitability. 37 Fed. Reg. 22612 (1972).
The SEC staff has recently determined that sales on credit of resort condominium
units with a rental management contract, arranged through broker-dealers, constituted
a sale of securities and as such were exempt from the provisions of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970). Nevertheless, the staff indicated it would rec-
ommend no enforcement action for violation of rule 10b-16 if there was full compliance
with Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.12 (1972), of the Truth in Lending Act. Com-
pliance with Regulation Z, however, does not nullify the apparent violation of the "ar-
ranging for credit" provisions of Regulation T. Yet the respective staff replies of the
Board and the SEC do not even suggest the possibility of Regulation T violations. Freed-
man, Silverberg & Lewis, Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 5
78,930 (SEC June 9, 1972).
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unit of participation is at least 5,000 dollars and where a minimum
of 25 percent of the total purchase price is paid in the initial in-
stallment. 5  REAC recommended that these arrangements should
be exempted from Regulation T if such an exemption "would not
substantially negate the application of Regulation T as a monetary
tool."6 The REAC recommendation implies that all real estate pro-
grams sold on an installment plan through brokers or dealers would
presently be in violation of Regulation T. The Committee com-
ments, however, indicate that REAC simply did not know, in light
of the Board's ruling, where Regulation T was applicable to all real
estate programs and consequently worded their report broadly
enough to encompass a number of interpretations.6 7
If the Board's ruling is properly interpreted as excluding tax-
shelter programs exempted from registration under section 5 of the
Securities Act, an additional problem appears. Section 7 (a) of the
Exchange Act grants the Board broad powers to "prescribe rules
and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be ini-
tially extended and subsequently maintained on any security (other
than an exempted security).,"68 The authority to exempt additional
securities from the operation of the Exchange Act and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, however, is specifically granted to
the SEC by section 3(a) (12) of that Act."' Section 7, as originally
enacted, set specific margin rates as temporary guidelines for the
Board."0 Although the Board is granted broad powers to raise or
lower those rates based on the national economy and present credit
extensions and conditions, it is not explicitly granted the power to
completely eliminate margin requirements for any securities. Al-
6 5 REAL ESTATE ADVISORY CoNMTTEE, REPORT TO THE SEC, at 62 (1972). The
REAC recommendations may be found in abbreviated form in BNA SEc. REG. L. REP.
E-2 (No. 173, 1972).
66 Id.
6 7 The REAC comments state in part:
Thus the [Board's] interpretation clearly applies to the public offering of lim-
ited partnership interests involving real estate programs and in effect prohibits
the public offering sale of real estate tax-shelter programs on an installment
basis ....
Should the [Board's) interpretation be deemed to apply to private offer-
ings or to intra-state offerings, the Committee feels that they too should be
subject to the recommended exemption.
Id. at 63, 67.
6815 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970).
69 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (12) (1970).
70 See note 9 supra.
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though the argument can 'be made that the power to set margin re-
quirements implies the power to eliminate them, the fact that the
explicit power to exempt securities from margin regulation is specifi-
cally granted by the same Act to the SEC undermines this conten-
tion.7 If the Board has, as this analysis implies, exempted securities
not registered under the Securities Act from the credit regulations
of the Exchange Act, it has usurped the authority of the SEC.
Finally, whether or not tax-shelter programs that are exempted
from section 5 of the Securities Act are subject to Regulation T, they
may be subject to the prohibitions of section 11(d) of the Exchange
Act.72 Both the NASD letter of inquiry and the Board's ruling ig-
nore the possible effect of this section on tax-sheltered programs
sold on an installment plan.73  Section 11(d) (1) prohibits the ex-
tension, maintenance, or arrangement of credit by any individual
who is both a broker and a dealer on any new issue of non-exempt
securities if he has participated in the distribution of those securities
"as a member of a selling syndicate or group within thirty days prior
to such transaction."7 4 The NASD admits that tax-shelter programs,
particularly in the oil and gas industries, are generally purchased as
part of a primary distribution (new issue) and are rarely, if ever,
traded by the investor. 5 It would seem, however, that by their very
nature many, if not most, tax-shelter programs would be handled
by individuals who are brokers and dealers and members of the sell-
ing syndicate. Thus, regardless of the applicability of Regulation
T, the sale of these programs on an installment plan would often
result in a violation of section 11(d) (1) of the Exchange Act.
71 This is not to deny that the Board has, in effect, set different margins for certain
securities transactions. Even conceding that the Board can abolish margin trading al-
together, as it did in 1946, there appears to be no authority for the Board to eliminate
credit regulation altogether. See generally 2 Loss, supra note 3, at 1244-48.
72 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1970).
73 Although the SEC is responsible for the interpretation and enforcement of this
section, the Board's failure to mention the possible application of § 11(d) (1) to the
installment sale of tax-shelter programs is puzzling.
74 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1970). While there are exceptions to the general rule
stated in § 11 (d) (1), they are not specifically applicable to tax-shelter programs. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.1ldl-1 (1972).
The purpose of § 11(d), as contrasted with the broad economic purposes of § 7
and Regulation T, see notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text, is to prevent an individual
who is both a broker and a dealer from taking advantage of his relationship with his
customers while he is a participant in the initial distribution of securities. See generally
WEISS, supra note 8, at 87-88
75 Letter from National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., supra note 35, at
7-9. It should be noted that the oil and gas legislation now before Congress would take
oil and gas programs registered pursuant to its provisions outside of § 11 (d), as well as
§ 7 and Regulation T. See notes 55-57 supra & accompanying text.
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Analysis of the Exchange Act and the credit restrictions of Regu-
lation T fails to reveal any basis for limiting the application of
the Regulation to tax-shelter programs registered pursuant to section
5 of the Securities Act. Even if we assume that the underlying pol-
icy rationales for credit regulation are not applicable to tax-shelter
programs,"" the unambiguous statutory language of section 7 and
the lack of difficulty in establishing federal jurisdiction can only lead
to the conclusion that Regulation T is applicable to all securities
(as defined in the Exchange Act and not specifically exempted from
its requirements) which are handled by brokers and dealers. Yet
the Board chose to limit its ruling to programs registered under the
Securities Act. It is imperative that the Board clarify its position in
view of -the uncertainty and confusion engendered by this ruling
among issors, brokers, dealers, and investors.
WILLiAM G. WEST
76 See notes 3-4 supra. The NASD argues, with some foundation, that a decision
to exempt tax-shelter programs from margin requirements will have no effect on mar-
ket speculation or price fluctuations. Letter from National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., supra note 35, at 5-9. However, its characterization of potential investors
as "sophisticated person[s] of substantial means" who are adequately protected by exist-
ing governmental and NASD rules and regulations is at least questionable. Id. See,
e.g., SEC v. American Agronomics Corp., No. C72-331 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 17, 1972)
(settlement required "special counsel" to determine if investment was "unsuitable," and
if so, issuer must offer recission to investor). Finally, the NASD assumption that the
development of energy resources should be encouraged by liberal credit arrangements
seems to imply that allocation of resource decisions should be made by someone other
than the consumer when, in fact, the basic principle of resource allocation is founded
on consumer decision-making in the market place. Letter from National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc., supra note 35, at 5-9.
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